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THE. ECONOMICS OF THE 1974 FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS*
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 19741 were

signed into law on October 15th of that year, 67 days after the Watergate Affair reached its culmination in Richard Nixon's resignation
from the Presidency. The legislation was more than temporally related to Watergate; its dominant stated purpose was to curb the types
of election campaign abuses in which Watergate had its genesis, abuses
which were themselves believed to be unavoidable given the then2
existing system of campaign financing.
The FECA Amendments radically enlarge the scope of previously
enacted controls on house, senate and presidential campaigns. 3 Limits
are imposed on contributions from individuals and organizations, on
expenditures which they may independently make on behalf of candidates, and on campaign spending by candidates and state and national political parties. 4 The as yet unutilized subsidy program for
presidential campaigns 5 is expanded to include presidential primary
campaigns6 and nominating conventions. 7 Candidates are subject to
new recordkeeping, reporting and disclosure requirements, as are individuals and organizations engaged in certain types of contributions
and expenditures." Increased penalties are provided for violations, 9
* I wish to
Graduate School
1. Pub. L.
U.S.C.A. (Supp.

thank David Henderson, Assistant Professor, University of Rochester
of Management, for his advice and criticism.
No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47
1976)). The major provisions of the FECA Amendments were upheld

in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), appeal docketed, Nos. 75-436,
-437, 96 S. Ct. 32 (1975).
2. See S. REP. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 931239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974). With regard to campaign financing generally,
see A. HEARD, THE COSTS oF DEMOCRACY (1960). For legal discussions of campaign
reform, see generally H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANCEs-Two
OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1971); Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 900 (1971); Rosenthai, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARv. J. LEGIs. 359 (1972); Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARv. Civ. I;UGHTSCiv. La. L. REv. 214 (1972).
VIEWS

3. Prior to the 1974 Amendments, the most recent major legislation affecting campaigns was the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.A. (1972)).
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 608 (Supp. 1976).
5. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 9001-13 (Supp. 1976).
6. Id. §§ 9031-37.
7. Id. § 9008.
8. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 432-37b (Supp. 1976).
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 608(i) (Supp. 1976); 26 U.S.C.A. § 9042 (Supp. 1976).
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and a Federal Election Commission is created to administer the various provisions. 10
The basic limits and subsidies are summarized:
Contribution Limits
(a) Individuals: limited to

(b) Candidates' contributions
to their own campaigns:
presidential candidate
senate candidate
house candidate
(c) Organizations:

$1,000 to any one candidate in a
primary election;
$1,000 to any one candidate in a
general election;
$1,000 in independent expenditures
made on behalf of any one candidate;
$25,000 aggregate to all federal
campaigns in a given campaign
period.

$50,000
$35,000
$25,000
$5,000 to any one candidate in a
primary election;
$5,000 to any one candidate in a
general election;
$1,000 in independent expenditures
made on behalf of any one candidate.

For both individuals and organizations, contributions consisting
of volunteered services are fully exempt. In-kind contributions are
exemlt only to the extent of $500 in value.
Spending Limits
The basic limits are given. In most cases an additional 20% of
these limits is allowed for fundraising expenditures.
(a) Presidential campaign:
candidate
national party

$10 million in primary election;
$20 million in general election.
X Voting Age Population
2
(VAP)

10. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 437c-h (Supp. 1976).
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(b) Presidential nominating
convention:
national party

$2 million

(c) Senate campaign:
candidate

8e X state VAP or $100,000,
whichever is greater, in primary
election;
12
X state VAP or $150,000,
whichever is greater, in general
election.

national party

2

X state VAP or $20,000, whichever is greater.

state party

2

X state VAP or $20,000, whichever is greater.

(d) House campaign:
candidate
national party
state party

$70,000 in primary election;
$70,000 in general election.
$10,000

$10,000

Subsidization of PresidentialCampaigns
(All amounts are subject to availability of funds.)
(a) Primary election:

eligibility:

matching of private contributions
up to $250 per contributor, up to
the $10 million spending limit;
the candidate must first raise
$5,000 in each of at least 20
states, not counting the excess
over $250 from any one contributor.

(b) Nominating convention:
major party (defined as any party receiving at least 25%
of the popular vote in the preceding presidential election)
-$2 million
minor party (defined as any party receiving at least 5%
of the popular vote in the preceding presidential election)
-an amount proportioned to the
ratio of minor party vote to
major party vote

[Vol. 25

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(c) General election:
major party
minor party

$20 million
amount proportioned to past election performance; improved performance in the current election
will produce eligibility for additional post-election funds.

new party

eligible only for post-election funds,
and then only if it receives at
least 5% of the popular vote in
the current election.

This Comment examines the probable effects of the FEGA Amendments on political behavior. Its thesis is that while candidate corruption stemming from campaign financing will to some degree be
reduced, that result will be accompanied by a number of less obvious
but no less serious consequences: increased discrimination in the distribution of political influence, distortions in the relative political
power of certain classes of groups and individuals, disincentives to
particular categories of campaign activity and, most importantly, the
creation of a legally closed monopoly of incumbents with all its attendant effects. Because these conclusions are reached by a relatively
straightforward microeconomic analysis, the applicability of economics
to political behavior is basic to their validity. In regard to this last
issue, then, a few words are in order.
Politics and Economics
Economics has been characterized as "the study of the principles
of constrained choice"--the science of how scarce means are allocated
among competing ends. As such, its relevance is not limited to activities involving only pecuniary motivations. The economist's wealthmaximizing model of human behavior has long given way to that of
utility-maximization, 2 which essentially states that regardless of what
constitutes utility for a person (pleasure, money, affection, virtue, etc.),
that individual chooses and acts in order to maximize it. The utilitymaximization model expressly recognizes that people may be motivated
by nonpecuniary goals. The scope of its applicability is perhaps best
evidenced by the relatively recent phenomenon of "economic im11. Rottenberg, Introduction to THE EcoNoMIcs

(S. Rottenberg ed. 1973).
12. See generally G.

STIGLER, THE THEORY OF

OF

PICE

CRIME

AND

PUNISHMENT I

46-84 (3d ed. 1966).
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perialism"' 3 -the burgeoning incursions by economists on such traditionally noneconomic fields as law, 14 penology, 15 sociology,' 6 demography1 7 and political theory.' 8

Politics is a secular activity; it consumes time, energy and money,
and it takes place in a world where these resources are scarce. Political
choices are thus constrained choices. The fact that politics may in large
part involve such intangibles as power and ideology in no way removes
political behavior from economic analysis. While the difficulties of
empirical measurement and verification may be greater, the laws of
demand are as relevant to the study of ideologues and power seekers
as they are to that of profit-hungry entrepreneurs. 9
I.

CORRUPTION AND PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS

Numerous characterizations of campaign contributions have been
set forth; 20 for this analysis it is useful to regard them in the context
of a market for political influence:
The basic model has three economic units -

the quid pro quo con-

13. Tullock, Book Review, 17 PUB. CHOICE 122, 123 (1974).
14. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972); G. TULLOCK, THE
LoGIc OF THE LAW (1971); THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed.

1975). For an introduction to the area, see Posner, The Economic Approach to Laio,
53 TEXAS L. REV. 757 (1975).

15. See, e.g., materials cited note 26 infra.
16. See, e.g., G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971);
Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part1, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Conference: New Economic Approaches to Fertility, 81 J. POL. ECON.
(Supp. 1973).
18. See, e.g., A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); W.
RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973);
G. TULLOCK, ToWARDS A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS (1967).
Some have gone so far as to suggest that the utility-maximization model may eventually produce a unified theory of all social sciences, much like the still awaited unified
field theory of physics. "Indeed, economic theory may well be on its way to providing
a unified framework for all behavior involving scarce resources, nonmarket as well as
market, nonmonetary as well as monetary, small group as well as competitive." Becker,
A Theory of Marriage: Part 1, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813, 814 (1973). One might regard
this as either scholarly progress or intellectual saber-rattling; whatever the case, this
Comment is far removed from any of the above-cited interdisciplinary combat zones,
being merely an examination of the probable effects of the FECA Amendments using
the simplest tools of microeconomics. Some readers may find this declaration of nonbelligerancy ingratiating. If so, it is suggested that they view this Comment as one more
illustration of the general substitutability of goods for one another: Demand curves,
like plowshares, can be beaten back into swords.
19. It may, for example, be quite difficult to empirically define and measure constant-quality units of power. Nonetheless, it is verifiably true that as the cost of obtaining power increases, power seekers will obtain less of it-which is merely to say that the
first law of demand is applicable to power seeking. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 17-30 (1962).
20. See A. HEARD, supra note 2, at 68-94.
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tributor, the ideological contributor, and the politician. The quid pro
quo contributor supplies campaign funds in exchange for political influence; he maximizes [his] profits. The ideological contributor supplies funds to maximize the probability of electing candidates with
desirable stands. The politician demands funds in exchange for politi2
cal influence; he maximizes political power. '
Clearly, a main object of concern on the part of those advocating
campaign reform has been the political effect of quid pro quo rather
than ideological contributions. While large ideological contributions
are not rare, concern over them is only of a general sort, regarding
their possibly disproportionate influence on both voters and candidates 22 It is the quid pro quo contributor, on the other hand, who is
commonly viewed as the cause of political corruption: "[A] public
official is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty
not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons., 23
This is the quo for the contributor's quid. The contributor may
be seeking specific, clearly understood favors, in which case he may be
regarded as attempting a purchase, or he may be after more general
policy favors, in which case he would be characterized as making an

investment with the hope of obtaining a satisfactory return. 24 Whatever the case, political influence can be properly termed a commodity;
contributors demand it, and candidates supply it in return for campaign funds.25 What then are the effects of the FECA Amendments
on the market for political influence?
The contribution limitations are prohibitions on certain types of
transactions in this market. Exchanges involving monetary sums above
the specified limits are illegal, and those engaging in such transactions
become subject to criminal penalties. The intended effect is essentially
that of deterrence-it is hoped that the threat of penalties will significantly reduce transactions in political influence. Economically, this
deterrence follows from the first fundamental law of demand, which
21. Welch, The Economics of Campaign Funds, 20 Pun. CHOICE 83, 84 (1975).
A similar characterization of contributions is set forth in Ben-Zion & Eytan, On Money,
Votes, and Policy in a Democratic Society, 17 PuB. CHO=CE 1 (1974), where contribu-

tions are classified as either "consumption expenditures" made for reasons of ideology, or
"investment expenditures" which have an expected return.
22. E.g., Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26

815, 819-20 (1974).
23. McMullan, A Theory of Corruption, 9
24. See Ben-Zion &Eytan, supra note 21.
25. Welch, supra note 21, at 84-92.

SOCIOLOOICAL Rrv.

STAN.

L. Rnv.

181, 183-84 (1961).
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states that as price increases, the rate of consumption decreases.2 6 For
the contributor, the threat of penalties raises the price of influence;
whereas he might previously have paid $25,000 for a certain favor, he
27
must now pay $25,000 and run the risk of a fine and jail sentence.
For the politician, the price of quid pro quo contributions has similarly
increased; in return for $25,000 of campaign funds he must both deliver a political favor and incur the risk of the added penalties. Even
where these sanctions can be avoided through elaborate machinations,
such avoidance will itself be manifested as an added cost in obtaining
the desired influence or funds.
Of course, trading in- political influence will not cease entirely as
a result of these added penalties, just as purchases of any commodity
do not drop to zero with a price increase. Even at higher prices, there
will still be those who find such transactions worthwhile. But trading
of this sort will decline as a result of the Amendments' contribution
limitations and, to whatever extent corruption stems from this trading,
such corruption will similarly decline. In this respect, then, the new
legislation will succeed in its goal. There are, however, several side
effects: discrimination among suppliers of political influence will increase, and certain classes of contributors will benefit at the expense
of others.
A. Discrimination and the Nonmoney Market for Political Influence
In limiting contributions, the FECA Amendments define that term
to cover transfers of "money or anything of value. 28s Nonetheless, the
limitations do not reach all exchanges involving political influence.
To begin with, services volunteered by individuals are specifically left
unrestricted regardless of value.29 This category is not limited to envelope stuffing and door-to-door canvassing; it includes endorsements
and campaign appearances by political figures and celebrities, and thus
encompasses substantially more than services of only minor importance.
26. There has recently been considerable economic analysis of the deterrent
effect of laws. See, e.g., ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (G.
Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974); THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (S. Rottenberg ed. 1973); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question
of Life and Death, 65 Am. ECON. Rnv. 397 (1975). For a brief overview of the economic approach to deterrence and its contrast to sociological approaches, see Tullock,
Does PunishmentDeter Crime?, PUB. INTEREST, Summer, 1974, at 103.
27. The penalties for violations of the contribution limits are a fine not exceeding

$25,000 and/or a jail sentence of up to one year. 18 U.S.G.A. § 608(i) (Supp. 1976).
28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 591(e) (1) (Supp. 1976).
29. Id. § 591(e) (5) (A).
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Furthermore, there are a host of activities which, while perhaps not
classifiable as volunteer services, will nonetheless be similarly excluded,
at least in practice, from the limitations: endorsements by popular organizations, pledges of ill-defined support by influential groups, promises to mobilize waves of individually small (and therefore individually
unrestricted) grassroot contributions. Such acts are so vague and incapable of valuation that their exclusion from control by the Amendments is a practical, if not theoretical, certainty. Nonetheless, these
are things which candidates seek and for which they will barter their
influence, either by promising specific favors or by agreeing to take
certain ideological stands. While such exchanges may not necessarily
be regarded as corrupting, it cannot be denied that the acquisition of
political influence is a motivating factor in the decisions of groups
and individuals to offer such support to candidates. In short, these
actions are nonmonetary exchanges of influence.
We have just seen how the FECA Amendments' contribution
limitations will restrict monetary exchanges for influence. Trading
in this commodity will nonetheless continue, for the supply and demand conditions which created the market have not changed. The
commodity of influence still retains its utility. Buyers will continue
to seek it, and candidates will continue to offer it in return for resources, such as endorsments, which are useful for vote-maximization.
Influence which would previously have been traded in monetary exchanges will now, at least in part, be available for purchasing through
still unrestricted nonmonetary exchanges. Influence seekers who previously would have purchased with money will now, at least in part,
atempt to purchase with nonmonetary commodities (popularity, fundraising ability, etc.). One consequence of restricted activity in the
money market will thus be increased activity in the nonmoney
market.3 0
This fact by itself is of little significance. The total effect of the
Amendments' contribution limitations must be to raise the composite
(money plus nonmoney) price of political influence, thereby reducing
30. For a brief introduction to nonmonetary competition, see A. ALCHIAN & W.
101, 103-04 (3d ed. 1972). For lengthier discussions,
see Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in
ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS

NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, SPECIAL CONFERENCE SERIES: ASPECTS OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 156 (1962); Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C.L. REv. 271

(1965).
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its consumption. If the total effect is a reduction in the corruption
which attends these transactions, we should not be concerned with an
increase in activity in one portion of the market-unless, that is, such
an increase has its own peculiar features.
One inherent characteristic of nonmonetary competition is that
of increased discrimination against "undesirable" groups. "When not
allowed to offer higher prices, [undesirable] people are less able to
compensate others to tolerate their 'undesirable' features."3 1
A law which establishes an effective ceiling on the prices at which
sellers can offer their wares prohibits the use of (direct) wealth in.

ducements [by undesirable groups]. It declares illegal the very force
which can be used to direct emphasis away from personal characteristics and to direct some of the wares of discriminating sellers to nonpreferred persons.3

In the context of competition for political influence, undesirable
groups are those with traits which put them at a disadvantage in competing, given the avenues of competition still open. They are, for
example, groups whose public endorsement a candidate might wish to
avoid: certain political groups, minority races, homosexuals, perhaps
even businessmen in certain localities. Previously, a candidate might
have incurred a cost by choosing to discriminate against such a group
in selling his favors or selecting his positions, that cost being the loss
of funds offered by the group for those favors. By limiting the funds
which such groups can now offer, and thereby limiting this potential
loss, the Amendments make such discrimination less costly. It follows
that as a result discrimination by candidates against such groups will
increase; as the cost of discrimination to those who wish to engage in
it falls, consumption of discrimination (i.e., engaging in it) rises.
While it is true that many minority groups are often too poor to
offer wealth inducements to discriminating sellers in the first place,
this is by no means the case for all minorities, nor is it true of poorminorities in all instances. In competing for political influence, no,
undesirable group is made better off by restrictions on monetary competition; to whatever extent such groups might, through monetary
contributions, have been able to compensate candidates to tolerate
their undesirable features in distributing influence, they are now less
able to do so as a result of the FECA Amendments.
31. UNIVERSITY EcoNmOIcs, supra note 30, at 103.
32. Demsetz, supra note 30, at 281-82.
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B. The Return on Investments in Candidates
A second effect of contribution limitations will be to distort the
capital market for investments in candidates. Certain classes of investors will receive a higher return on candidate investments, while
others will be effectively precluded from making such investments.
Clearly ,not all individuals and organizations are equally capable
of making the types of contributions which by their nature are unaffected by the Amendments' restrictions. Labor unions, for example,
are one type of organization which is particularly adept at influencing
elections without running afoul of the new limitations. They are
generally capable of mobilizing their own sizable memberships and
of conducting public educational campaigns of considerable impact.
Similarly, political incumbents often possess significant power to affect
elections through their endorsements and campaign appearances. In
the case of both unions and incumbents, ability to contribute to campaigns is not significantly impaired by the new legislation. 3 The same
cannot be said, for example, of the millionaire whose only value to a
candidate lies in his money.
The FECA Amendments can thus be seen to produce a change
in the relative political clout of contributors. Assume a set of millionaires, labor unions and incumbents who were previously on a par in
regard to their power vis-a-vis candidates; what the unions could accomplish through their funds and organizational structure, and what
the incumbents could accomplish through their popularity, the millionaires could accomplish through their money. In restricting contributions of private money, the Amendments have correspondingly increased the political importance of certain organizational and situational assets.
This effect can be restated economically using the investment
model of campaign contributions. 34 The return on such investments
is political influence. When the flow of capital is unrestricted, the
return rate on investments (adjusted for risk) will be generally every33. Prior controls on union and corporate political activities did not restrict expenditures for voter education programs and communications to members. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 610 (Supp. 1976). This exemption is continued by the FECA Amendments in their
definition of "expenditure." 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 591(f) (4)(B),(C) (Supp. 1976).
In regard to political activity by unions generally, see A. HEARD, supra note 2, at
169-211. For one example of increased union political power in the aftermath of the
Amendments, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1975, at 12, col. 3.
34. See notes 21 & 24 supra & accompanying text. See also Tullock, The Purchase
of Politicians,10 WESTERN ECON. J. 354 (1972).
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where equal. If any investment areas are producing higher than average return rates, then capital will be attracted to those areas and investment in them will rise. Eventually, as the law of diminishing
marginal returns takes effect, those higher return rates will fall to
average.
Investments in candidates are no exception; capital will flow to
this area when its return rates are above average, and capital will leave
when its return rates are below average. The Amendments, however,
exclude certain classes of investors (those with primarily private money
resources) from making sizable political investments. The effect is
to increase the return rate to those political investors not excluded.
"The return in political favors on campaign assistance can get above
the competitive rate of return on resources of the economy as a whole
if some donors are barred from the market." 355
The argument might at this point be raised that sale of political
influence will be reduced not only by contribution limitations, but also
by the fact that, as a result of the Amendments, candidates will have
less need for campaign funds. Expenditure limitations will reduce the
amount of funds that candidates can use and, in presidential races,
subsidization will further decrease (and in some cases eliminate) candidate dependence on private contributions. Since candidates will need
less money, they will less readily sell themselves.
This argument ignores the source of market value. A commodity's
market value arises from the desire of potential buyers for that commodity, and not from any special needs of those supplying it. The
value of political influence stems from its nature, from the fact that
people are eager to obtain it; that value is not diminished by any
lessening of candidates' need for campaign funds. The market value
of a house does not change when its owner wins a lottery; the value of
influence does not change when its supplier receives a federal subsidy.
If the supplier's monetary campaign needs are in fact satisfied by subsidies, he can still trade his influence for either nonmonetary campaign assets or for money which he will put to other uses.36
35. Tullock, supra note 34, at 355. One might argue that, in a representative society, unions deserve a higher rate of return on their political investments than do millionaires. Note, however, that at issue here is not voting power per se; the millionaire has
his one vote, the union has all the votes of its members that it can deliver. Rather, the
issue is power to affect the votes of outsiders. In that respect, the argument for a higher
return to unions is by no means clear-cut. Even granting the argument, it does not follow
that incumbents deserve the higher return rate which they too receive as a result of the
Amendments.
36. It is conceivable that sales of influence could decrease as a result of the wealth
-effect produced on candidates by subsidies and spending limits. Wealth effects are changes
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CAMPAIGN SUBSIDIZATION AND ECONOMIC WASTE

Subsidies are a form of wealth redistribution, producing benefits,
which we assume are the reason for their existence, and entailing costs.
Of the latter, some, such as the costs of subsidies themselves and the
costs of their administration, are immediate and obvious. Other costs
are less apparent: There are possible incentive or disincentive effects
on the productivity of those receiving or providing the subsidies, and

there is waste in conduct undertaken by potential recipients as they
seek to become eligible--conduct which, but for the subsidies, would

not have occurred and whose encouragement was not intended.
Perhaps the least understood source of potential waste is that in-

volved in subsidies-in-kind and cash grants whose purchasing use is restricted to certain types of goods. This occurs when the subsidy's value
to the recipient is less than its market value; from the recipient's point

of view this difference in value is wasted,37 and he may attempt to
minimize this waste by putting the subsidy to uses not intended by its
sponsors. Thus, for example, a recent study of the federal food-stamp
program estimates that one dollar in food stamps is worth only eightytwo cents to the average recipient.38 "Participants... attempt to reduce
waste by purchasing convenience in specially prepared foods, by purchasing foods in the high-price, service-oriented stores . . .or by il-

legally trading food stamps for other goods or cash." 39
produced in a person's consumption pattern by changes in that person's wealth: families

consume less bologna as they become wealthier; a poor man is less likely to sell his blood
if he receives a large inheritance. Consumption of bologna and sale of blood are known
in economics as inferior activities: people engage in smaller amounts of such activities
as their wealth increases. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 429 (9th ed. 1973).
The Amendments' spending limits and subsidization increase the total monetary resources available to a candidate; the former by limiting his expenditures for one item
(campaigning) and therefore increasing the funds available to him for all other items,
the latter by giving him additional funds. The Amendments may thus be said to increase the wealth of candidates. It is possible that influence peddling is an inferior activity and that the wealth increase from the Amendments will cause candidates to engage
in less of it. It is, however, very improbable. Inferior activities are extremely rare (id.)
and there is no data to support the contention that influence peddling is in fact an activity of this nature, let alone the belief that the wealth effect will produce a significant
decrease in the activity.
The wealth-effect argument in effect claims that as candidates become richer they will
become purer, and that they should therefore be made richer with public funds as a
matter of social policy. As indicated, such a policy rests on very tenuous grounds--its
only certain effect would be to vastly increase the quantity and vigor of campaigns.
37. See UNIVERSITY ECONOICS, supra note 30, at 148-54. The analysis is applicable to both public and private gifts-in-kind.
38. K. CLARUSdN, FOOD STAMPS AND NUTRITION 42 (1975).
39. Id. at 61.
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Since federal campaign funds are restricted in use to campaign expenditures, this in-kind waste is a possibility in the program. Similarities to the food-stamp abuses described above are readily imaginable:
use of higher-priced, less tiring campaign techniques such as TV spots,
engaging in concealed expenditures unrelated to campaigning, etc. The
in-kind waste can be reduced by expenditure limitations, which act as
a ceiling on subsidies. Given the spending limits in the FECA Amendments and the high levels of unsubsidized spending in recent presidential campaigns, the amount of such waste under the current program is probably small. 40 As will be demonstrated in the discussions
of incentive effects and monopolization, however, the same spending
limits which minimize in-kind waste create new problems as well.
III. INCENTIVE EFFECTS ON CAMPAIGN AcrIviTY

Considered without regard to expenditure limitations, subsidies
will increase campaign activity by subsidized candidates, relative to the
campaigning that would have occurred without subsidies. Federal
funds will, in effect, reduce the cost to candidates of such campaigning, and therefore their consumption of it will increase. A similar
effect will occur among candidates and parties which do not meet the
threshhold eligibility requirements for subsidization, but which believe
that eligibility is worth a try: In attempting to meet the minimum requirements for funding, whether in terms of election performance or
contribution spread, 41 they too will increase their campaigning beyond
what it would otherwise have been, since the return from such activity
is now potentially greater than it was previously.
This increase will not be true of all parties. Consider party A
which perceives the eligibility requirements to be beyond its capabilities. To the extent to which A is concerned with its fraction of the
total votes cast in an election, and undertakes campaigning in order
to increase that fraction, the extra campaigning of its subsidized opponents will affect A in the form of an increased campaigning cost to
A. The extra campaign activity will improve the share of votes re40. Note that private campaign contributions are also gifts-in-kind, since their use
is similarly restricted if the donors' intentions are honored. In-kind waste is thus a
possibility even under a system of private campaign financing. It does not follow, however, that the issue of in-kind waste should be ignored in considering how public funds
are to be utilized.
41. See the eligibility requirements, set forth in the text accompanying note 10
supra, for primary election matching grants and for major- and minor-party status.
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ceived by A's subsidized opponents, either by attracting new voters or
by taking votes away from A.4 A will now have to campaign more
just to receive the same share of votes it previously had; in effect, the
cost to A of equally effective campaigning has increased. If A was previously on the margin between entering and not entering the race,
the added cost will cause A not to campaign altogether. Thus, the
total effect of subsidies will be to increase campaigning by both subsidized parties and by minor parties striving for subsidies, while discouraging campaigns by less successful minor parties.
Expenditure limits complicate this analysis, for they too produce
incentive effects. Consider party B whose campaign activity is actually
restricted by the spending limits, and opponent party C whose activity
is not. Under the Amendments, C will face less opposition campaigning from B than it would otherwise have encountered. The cost to C
of equally effective campaigning is thus decreased by the restriction
on B; parties similar to C which were previously on the margin between entering and not entering the race will now enter. Finally consider D, which believes that outspending B is a necessity if D is to win
and plans to do exactly that. The new spending limits now prevent D
from conducting such a campaign. Faced with the legal impossibility
of doing what it believes necessary for victory, D may well choose not
to campaign at all. The total incentive effect of spending limits will
be to encourage campaigning by those not directly restricted by the
limits while discouraging very high-powered campaigns. The latter,
of course, are often the very type of campaign necessary to successfully
challenge an incumbent.43
Because they are not subsidized, house and senate candidates will
bear only the incentive effects of the spending limits. Presidential
candidates will face the aggregate of both spending limit and subsidization effects: some minor parties will be discouraged and possibly cease
campaigning-the party A situation; some minor parties may remain
unaffected-the combination of A and C; and some minor parties will
increase their campaigning. High-powered challenges will be discouraged, and those who would have conducted them may not even enter
the races.
42. This must be the case if A's opponents act rationally in undertaking their extra
campaign activity.
43. See Table I in text accompanying note 51 infra.
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IV.

ENTRY RESTRICTIONS AND INCUMBENTS' MONOPOLY

The analogies between the economic marketplace and the political
arena are for the most part easily drawn. Producers and politicians
both ultimately depend for their success upon consumer choice-the
economic choice of purchasing and the political choice of voting. Both
attempt to affect such choice through advertising. For both, success is
never automatically assured; ideally, there is always the threat of competition.
These elementary comparisons suffice to show the relevance to
politics of the economic notions of new-product entry, monopoly, and
competitive barriers. The proposition which will here be developed
is that the FECA Amendments create a monopoly of political incumbency; that while incumbents may have previously enjoyed a competitive advantage relative to new entrants, the legislatively imposed restrictions on expenditures and contributions now effectively prevent
that advantage from being overcome.
A. Information Costs and New-Product Entry
Information is not a free good; 44 obtaining it takes time, energy,
and oftentimes money. To a consumer the cost of information about
a product is part of the cost of that product; 45 he must determine
whether the good exists, where it is sold, what it is selling for. Producers often find it advantageous to pay the costs of distributing such
information to the consumer themselves; in so doing, they seek to increase sales by lowering the total purchase cost of their products. The
first law of demand predicts that such an approach will work. Empirical observation, such as skimming through any newspaper, confirms
that it does.
The cost of information to consumers is perhaps the greatest com44. See generally Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213

(1961).
45. See, e.g., Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15

J.LAw & EcoN. 337 (1972).
The full cost of purchase (Cf) of a good to a consumer includes not only the
cost of the item itself (Og) but the cost of knowledge (Ck) concerning the location of sales outlets and prices and the cost of time and transportation (Ct)
required to purchase the item:

0, = C + Ck + C
Id. at 338.
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petitive obstacle faced by new products. Advertising is the essential
means by which to overcome that barrier.
The situation faced by a new political entrant is no different. The
political analogue of purchasing is voting. To each voter the costs of
voting itself (going to the polls, etc.) are the same regardless of for whom
he votes. For a potential voter for candidate X, however, the cost of
voting for X involves not only the cost of voting itself, but the cost
of obtaining sufficient information about X to decide to vote for him.
Where X is a new, relatively unknown candidate, such information

costs are, in their aggregate, huge. These costs must either be borne
by X in the form of an election campaign conducted by him, or they
must be borne by his potential voters. The higher the information
costs which fall on potential voters for X, the fewer the votes which
6
will be cast for X.4
For the unknown political entrant, then, there exists a positive
correlation between campaign activity, voter familiarity, and votes
cast.4 7 Despite the simplicity of the model here set forth, this conclu-

sion does not change when the analysis becomes more complex. The
fact that campaign advertising serves not only to familiarize voters but
also to change their preferences only strengthens the correlation between campaign funds expended and votes received by the new candidate. The fact that the ratio of votes received to campaign dollars
spent may decrease as campaign expenditures rise is only a reflection
of the law of diminishing marginal returns; 48 it does not contradict the

basic conclusion. The fact that overspending may actually lose a candidate votes is also not inconsistent since this phenomenon does not
occur until a sizable amount of funds has in fact been spent.
46. It is not being claimed here that, given sufficiently low information costs regarding X, everyone will vote for him. The analysis is limited to potential voters for a
specific candidate-voters who, if they had sufficient knowledge of that candidate, would
vote for him. The analysis says only that as the price of this information increases, fewer
of those voters will vote for X. This implicitly suggests a saturation effect: After a point,
decreasing the information costs to voters may produce no increase in votes received,
since all potential voters for X may already have sufficient information about him.
47. This rather obvious observation has been empirically verified. A study of 1972
and 1974 congressional campaign expenditures finds that "[t]he more money challengers
spent, not only relatively, but in absolute terms as well, the better they tended to do on
election day." G. Jacobson, Practical Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform: An
Incumbent Protection Act? 6 (unpublished paper, delivered at the 1975 annual meeting
of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n; forthcoming in 24 PUB. PoLicy-(Winter, 1976)).
48. The applicability of this law to campaign expenditures has been similarly
verified. Id.
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The new entrant competes with other new entrants and with incumbents. Political incumbency is not a status that is limited to the
particular holders of office at any one time; rather it should be viewed
as applying, in lessening degree, on several levels: (1) the particular
politicians currently in office; (2) the particular party which is currently dominant; (8) the particular parties (Democratic and Republican) which currently occupy the slots in a two-party system; (4) the
particular system (currently that of two major parties) which is currently in effect. Anyone situated in any of these levels can be regarded
as possessing an incumbency interest. Furthermore, the benefits of
such an interest can extend beyond the time of its actual possession,
as in the case of a former officeholder who, in forming a new party
or running as an independent, irades in on his previously acquired
fame. Competitive advantages of incumbency are enjoyed by actual
incumbents over major party challengers, and by major parties over
minor parties. The totally new entrant, the unknown candidate running on a new or minor party platform, is without any incumbent
competitive advantage at all. He is therefore most dependent upon
new-product advertising (i.e., campaigning) for electoral success.
B. The FECA Amendments and Closed Entry
Although a person may have a legal right to enter the market,
any obstacle to providing information about himself will protect
those sellers already in the market, about whom buyers are better
informed ....
...

How should General Motors act.., if it wanted to restrain

the growth of .. . Volkswagen? One way would be to prohibit advertising.49
There are three ways in which the FECA Amendments restrict
new-product advertising in the political marketplace:
(1) Fundraising is made costlier. The costs of raising a given
amount of capital are increased by limits on individual contributions,
by recordkeeping requirements, and by disclosure requirements. (The
costs of lost privacy imposed by disclosure requirements fall on both
candidates and contributors; the latter will thus be less willing to
contribute.)
(2) Subsidization will in many instances increase the advertising
49.

UNVTSrrY ECONOMICS,

supra note 30, at 367.
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of "established" products, thereby increasing the cost of equally effective unsubsidized new-product advertising.
(3) Expenditure limitations restrict the amount of capital that
can be used in campaigning, and so limit the total amount of advertising that can be carried on by the new entrant.
Monopolization is a matter of degree; barriers to entry exist to
some degree in every field, and the issue of monopoly depends upon
the size of those barriers. The competitive advantages of incumbents
have always acted as an entry barrier in politics; the situation prior
to enactment of the FEGA Amendments could to some extent have
been correctly described as a monopoly of incumbents. The Amendments, however, do more than merely increase the degree of monopolization; as will be shown, they create'a legally closed monopoly of incumbents, almost certainly with regard to totally new entrants and
quite probably with regard to more advantaged entrants as well.
In order to demonstrate this, it is first necessary to form some
estimate of the general value of incumbency in elections. If the Amendments limit what a challenger can spend to an amount less than the
value of the incumbent's advantage, then new entry is, in general,
legally impossible and a closed monopoly has been created.
The magnitude of the competitive advantage of incumbents is
evident from both the personal benefits of holding political office and
from the record of incumbents' election performance. The officeholder
constantly enjoys incomparably greater access to and coverage by the
news media. Likewise, such incidents of office as the franking privilege
facilitate direct contact with his constituency. His advantage as exhibited in election results is similarly formidable: Over the past four
election years an average of 95.5% of Representatives who ran for
reelection in general elections were victorious;50 for Senators the average is 83.7% over that same period.r' In the past six presidential
elections in which an incumbent ran, not one has been defeated.
Two recent studies have attempted econometric valuations of the
competitive advantage of congressional incumbency. Their results for
house elections are summarized in Table I, which also shows the spending limits imposed by the Amendments. (As indicated by the column
headings, the two studies were not identical in terms of the question
each sought to answer.)
50. Based on figures in Americans for Democratic Action, Special Report: Advantages of an Incumbent Seeking Re-Election 1 (1975).
51. Id.
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TABLE I

EVALUATION OF INCUMBENT'S ADVANTAGE wITH RESPECT TO A MAJOR
OPPONENT IN

Democratic challenger facing
Republican incumbent:
1972 elections

HousE

Welch Study5 2
"If one candidate is an incumbent, how much money
must his opponent spend to
negate that incumbency,
other things being equal?" 5 3

Jacobson Study54
"Estimated total expenditures
required for prediction of
victory for a challenger when
incumbent and challenger
expenditures are equal" 5 5

$223,000

$156,000

(inflation-adjusted to
Nov. 1974)
1974 elections
Republican challenger facing
Democratic incumbent:
1972 elections

($192,000)
$144,000

$199,000

(inflation-adjusted to
Nov. 1974)
1974 elections
FECA Amendments
Spending Limits:
General election5 6
General plus primary
election 5 7

PARTY

ELECTIONS

$184,000
($221,000)
$185,000

$104,000

$104,000

$188,000

$188,000

From Table I the following is clear: 5
(1) The general-election spending limit alone is far below all estimates of expenditures necessary to defeat an incumbent.
52. Welch, supra note 21.
53. Id. at 96. Incumbency valuation figures are from id. at 97.
54. Jacobson, supra note 47.
55. Id. at Table 4. Incumbency valuation figures are from Table 4, id.
56. The general-election spending limit breaks down as follows: $70,000 candidate
expenditures, $14,000 fundraising expenditures, $10,000 national-party expenditures,
$10,000 state-party expenditures.
57. The primary-election spending limit consists of $70,000 candidate expenditures
plus $14,000 fundraising expenditures.
58. A strict statistical analysis of these valuations would require use of probability
distributions rather than absolute figures. Such distributions, however, are not readily
available from the data given in the studies, and the absolute figures here presented
should be interpreted accordingly. Similarly, the concept of closed entry, while phrased
in absolute terms, should be understood to refer to a relatively high improbability pf
entry, rather than to an absolute impossibility. It is always possible that a challenger may
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(2) The total spending limit (general and primary elections
combined) is below both Welch's estimate and Jacobson's inflationadjusted 1972-based estimate; it is also perilously close to Jacobson's
estimate of what a successful Republican challenger would have needed
in 1974.
With respect to" house elections, Jacobson concludes as follows:
The analytical tool is in danger of being stretched beyond its
capacity here and these figures should be taken as merely illustrative.
But considering that $28,000 of the total may be spent only on raising
the rest and that $20,000 must be spent by the party on the candidate's
behalf (a sum, given past experience, not likely to be forthcoming),
there seems to be a distinct possibility that successful challenges in
House contests, particularly by Republican candidates, have been
made less likely.
Analysis of the spending of the ten nonincumbents who defeated
incumbent representatives in 1972 provides more evidence to the same
point. Taking inflation into account, five of the ten clearly spent
more than would be permitted under the new law. 50
It should be noted that neither of these studies dealt with minorparty candidates. (As a practical matter, this would have been impossible.) We should expect however that an incumbent's advantage with
respect to such a candidate is at least as large as it is with respect to
a major-party challenger. In view of the fact that minor parties face
huge information costs with regard to voter familiarity (let alone with
regard to altering voter preferences), it is almost certain that, in general, the incumbent's advantage with respect to a minor-party challenger is in fact far greater. Furthermore, minor-party candidates
rarely engage in primary campaigns in obtaining their candidacies; in
congressional races their expenditures will thus be limited to the
$104,000 figure. The conclusion is inescapable that, with respect to
totally new entrants in house elections, the FECA Amendments generally create a legally closed incumbents' monopoly; with respect to
more advantaged entrants, there is substantialevidence that the general
effect is similar.60
spend less than the amount generally required to overcome an incumbent's advantage
and yet still win; in particular races such a result may even be the most probable one.
The analysis here is of necessity limited to general conclusions. Its validity is not thereby
impugned, just as the usefulness of such general terms as monopoly and entry barriers
is not impaired by their generality.
59. Jacobson, supra note 47, at 7.
60. In senate elections the closed-entry effect for major-party challengers is less
certain. Jacobson did not directly compute valuations of the senatorial incumbency advantage. On the basis of other calculations he concludes that challengers in senate races

1976]

FECA AMENDMENTS

C. Some Effects of Monopolization
The imposition of legal restraints on market entry results in a
61
wealth increase for those already in the market. A municipal prohibition on new taxicabs will increase the value of existing taxicabs.
The owners of the existing cabs will be made wealthier by an amount
known as the monopoly rent.62
In increasing barriers to entry into the political market, the FECA
Amendments create a wealth increase for current incumbents. Under
the multitiered scheme of incumbency previously set out, those with
interests in any of the levels of incumbency are, to the extent of those
interests, beneficiaries of this monopoly rent. Lessened competition
increases the stability of the major parties; as a result, officials in those
parties now hold more valuable positions. Lobbyists who had cultivated officeholders and developed valuable political contacts now hold
more valuable contacts.
The monopoly rent is greatest for those holding the greatest incumbency interest-incumbents themselves. As a result of greater
will not be hurt by the spending limits. Id. at 7. Welch's senate estimates are substantially less statistically significant than his house estimates, which were highly significant.
Welch, supra note 21, at 96-97. This is possibly due to the fact that senate races are far
fewer in number. Welch does give the following senate incumbency valuations: Democratic incumbent's advantage-$73,000 per congressional district; Republican incumbent's advantage-$80,000 per congressional district. Id. at 97. Multiplying these figures
by the number of congressional districts in each state, and comparing the results to the
respective state spending limits for senate campaigns based on 1974 projected voting age
populations (120 CoNG. REc. S18542 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974)), it is found that no
general closed monopoly is created when spending limits for primaries and general elections are added together. (In only one state, West Virginia, is campaign spending
limited to an amount less than that necessary for a challenger to negate the incumbent's advantage, and there only with respect to a Republican incumbent.) However,
if only general-election spending limits are considered (as in the case of most minorparty candidates), closed monopolies are found in 33 states: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado (only with respect to a Republican incumbent), Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska (only with respect to a Republican incumbent), New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
As was the case with minor-party candidates in house races, this closed-entry
effect in senate races is probably underestimated; the incumbency valuations used in calculating the effect are based on what major-party challengers face, while the competitive
advantage enjoyed by incumbents with respect to minor-party challengers will generally
be considerably greater (given the larger information costs which minor parties usually
face).
In interpreting these results, the reader should bear in mind the qualifications mentioned in note 58 supra as well as the lesser statistical significance of Welch's results
for incumbent senators.
61. See UNmRsrry EcoNoMIcs, supra note 30, at 374-76.
62. Id. at 296-97.
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entry barriers, their legislative seats have become more secure; in
effect, their probable lengths of tenure, adjusted for risk of reelection
defeat, have increased. One empirical study of the relationship between
campaign expenditures and value of the office sought concludes that
a longer term will have the effect of inducing larger per period expenditures on the part of office seekers. In terms of the simple investment model, this indicates that the benefits from obtaining the
single four-year term [of gubernatorial office] are larger than those
from obtaining two successive two-year terms. This result is directly

counter to that supposed by supporters of proposals to increase the
length of tenure for political offices as a means to reduce campaign
expenditures.6"
In short, increasing the term of office increases the value of that office..
This too is a monopoly rent.
One result of increased office value is that the value of the political influence possessed by the officeholder rises. When incumbents
are more secure with respect to reelection, those concerned with obtaining influence (lobbyists, bribe offerors, etc.) are more certain that
their investments in incumbents will not be destroyed through thelatter's defeat in upcoming elections. Since these investments will besafer, their risk-adjusted return rates will be greater. More capital will
be attracted to this investment area, and the result will be an increasein the market value of incumbents' influence.6 4 Uncorrupted office-holders constantly pay a price for remaining honest; that price, known
as opportunity cost, is the money which they could have received had
they chosen to sell out. By raising the opportunity cost of integrity,
the Amendments will produce a decrease in consumption of integrity
(i.e., remaining honest). Thus the decrease in officeseeker corruption,
which was seen to result from contribution limitations will be accompanied by an increase in officeholder corruption due to monopolization.
Another effect of reduced political competition will be in the area
of government efficiency from the public's point of view. Competition,.
real or potential, generally serves to "regulate" producers by rewarding efficiency and attention to consumer desires. For officeholders,
63. W. Grain & R. Tollison, On the Regulation of the Market for Governors: An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Term Length and Rules of Succession 4 (unpublished
manuscript, Texas A&M Univ. 1975; forthcoming in J. LAw & EcoN.).
64. "The greater a politician's power, the greater the VMP [value of marginal,
product] schedule of [quid pro quo] contributions made to him." Welch, supra note 21,,
at 87.
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potential competition is manifested in the threat of future electoral
,defeat. Absent the Amendments, a legislator could disregard his constituency, but he would pay dearly for it at the polls. By diminishing
this possibility of electoral defeat, the Amendments reduce the cost to
.officeholders of such legislative indifference; they can now be expected
to engage in more of it.65
D. A Further Consideration Regarding Closed Entry keeper

The Gate-

Title II of the FECA Amendments establishes a Federal Election
Commission to administer the overall program, with powers of investigation, civil enforcement and promulgation of necessary regulations. In examining the potential effects of the Amendments, the probable behavior of the agency administering it merits attention.
The "captured agency" hypothesis of regulation states that regulatory agencies will generally behave in the best interests of the economic
groups which they were formed to regulate, rather than in the interests
-of the consuming public. 6 This behavior is not a result of poorly
.chosen administrators or inadequate budget appropriations; rather, it
is inherent in the very nature of the regulatory process. The targets
.of regulation are
concentrated groups to whom the issue makes a great deal of difference. The public interest is widely dispersed. In consequence, in the
absence of any general arrangements to offset the pressure of special
interests, producer groups will invariably have a much stronger in67
fluence .

.

. than will the diverse, widely spread consumer interest.

Note that, under this hypothesis, it is not through irrational public apathy or ignorance that agency capture occurs. Given the diffusion
65. For a discussion of low political entry barriers as a control on government, see
Trullock, Entry Barriers in Politics, 55 AM. ECON. REv.-PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 458
(1965).
66. See generally Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. &
MANAGEMENT ScI. 3 (1971).

For a brief discussion of the various forms of the hy-

pothesis, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L.
REv. 1669, 1684-87 (1975).

Louis Jaffe states that the thesis is "not demonstrable."

jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L.
REv. 1105, 1107 (1954). His position, however, boils down to the claim that all results consistent with the hypothesis can be explained away in less sinister terms, a contention which does not go to the predictive power of the hypothesis. For a demonstration of this power, at least in comparison to that of. the consumer-protection and no.effect theories of regulation, see Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure
.and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 151 (1972).
67. M.

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

143 (1962).
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of its interests and the huge costs of effectively organizing itself, the
public acts rationally in allowing such capture by more concentrated
interests; agency capture by consumers is just not generally worth the
expense to them which it would entail.
The captured agency hypothesis provides one prediction of the
Federal Election Commission's behavior. A proponent of the hypothesis would, looking at the Commission, not require very much
thought to determine by whom it will be captured and how long this
process will take. The incumbents protected by the Amendments'
entry barriers are the legislators who established the Commission, who
must confirm the appointments of its voting members,"" and who may
disapprove its proposed regulations before they take effect. 60 The act
of the Commission's creation was the act of its capture. In terms of the
nexus between those who benefit from entry barriers and those who
established the administering agency for those barriers, the creation of
the Federal Election Commission is unique in the history of American
administrative law.
SUMMARY

The primary stated intent of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments is the control of campaign abuse. The issue is: At what
cost?
The Amendments will in fact reduce the corruption of candidates
stemming from quid pro quo contributions. This is not all they will
do, and, in terms of social priorities, this reduction is certainly not
their most important result. That distinction is reserved for the Amendments' creation of a closed incumbents' monopoly through restrictions
on the campaigning necessary for successful electoral challenges. There
will be other effects as well: discrimination will play a greater role in
the distribution of political influence by candidates; certain groups will
suffer a diminution of their ability to affect elections while that of
others, including incumbents, will be correspondingly increased; campaigning will in some instances be discouraged, especially campaigning
by serious political challengers. The consequences of monopolization
will themselves extend beyond affecting challengers alone: Corruption
68. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a) (1) (Supp. 1976).
69. Id. § 438(c). The Senate may disapprove regulations affecting senatorial candidates, the House may disapprove regulations affecting house candidates, and both may
disapprove regulations affecting presidential candidates.
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of officeholders will increase, undermining the very goal of the legislation. In the long run, the most serious consequence may well be that
resulting from the lessening of potential competition for political office,
for in so doing the FECA Amendments diminish the most fundamental
guarantee of government responsibility, efficiency and responsiveness.
In that sense, the cost of this legislation will be a price paid by us all.
SAM KAZMAN
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